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  Abstract: Leif Wenar examines the impact on takings scholarship of the redefinition of 
 "property" early in the twentieth century. He argues that the Hohfeldian 
 characterization of property as rights (instead of as tangible things) forced 
 major scholars such as Michelman, Sax, and Epstein into extreme interpretations 
 of the Takings Clause. This extremism is unnecessary, however, since the 
 original objections to the idea that "property is things" are mistaken. 
 
  
 
 
Text: 
 
What constitutes a taking of private property is a question that admits to a 
 rigid logical answer, so it is always possible to judge which judicial decisions 
 are clearly right or clearly wrong. On this question .... there is simply no 
 room for intellectual disagreement or for judicial deference to the legislature. 
  
   Richard Epstein   n1 
  
 
 As Justice Brennan candidly admitted in Penn Central ... whether or not a 
 government action is a taking "depends largely 'upon the particular 
 circumstances [in that] case.'" The Court must engage in "essentially ad hoc, 
 factual inquiries." 
  
  But is anything wrong with "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"? That is 
 simply one way of expressing a pragmatic approach to decision making. Pragmatism 
 is essentially particularist, essentially context-bound and holistic; each 
 decision is an all-things-considered intuitive weighing. 
  
   Margaret Radin   n2 
  
 
 
 
       The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution reads: "nor shall 
 private property be taken for public use without just compensation."   n3 It is 
 perhaps not surprising that legal academics have vigorously disputed the 
 interpretation of such a politically charged text. What is surprising - as the 
 quotations above suggest - is how distant these academic interpretations have 
 become from each other. Even more surprising is how far all of these academic 
 interpretations are from what a nonspecialist or layman would think is at stake 
 in the Takings Clause. One  [*1924]  might imagine any number of explanations 
 for such a state of affairs. I will claim, however, that all sides in the 
 academic debate have been drawn into extreme interpretative positions by a 
 fundamental mistake in the modern legal analysis of property. This mistake is, 
 in fact, the standard academic understanding of property itself. 
  
       The plan of the argument is as follows. I first explore the background of 
 two influential academic approaches to the Takings Clause - the Michelman-Sax 
 and Epstein approaches - by tracing their roots back to the early days of 
 "Scientific" thinking about property around the turn of this century.   n4 The 
 pivotal event in Scientific analysis of property was the Hohfeldian rejection of 
 the layman's identification of property with tangible things. The Hohfeldians 
 favored a conception of property not as things but as rights, and this 
 rights-centered conception quickly became legal orthodoxy. 
  
       However, this Scientific conception of property as rights entails a reading 
 of the Takings Clause that radically restricts the ways in which the government 
 can legitimately alter property entitlements. Such a reading is conservative in 
 requiring that most existing property entitlements be left intact, and 
 libertarian in the sense of limiting the powers that the state may rightly 
 exercise. 
  
       This conservative-libertarian reading of the Clause is one that early 
 post-Hohfeldian interpreters were anxious to avoid. Yet these early interpreters 
 also could not return to the pre-Hohfeldian idea that property is things. I show 
 briefly how their attempts to shift the focus of the Clause away from the 
 troublesome concept of property led to the successive destabilizations of the 
 meanings of the Clause's other central terms. 
  
       This history of revisions is the background to Michelman's and Sax's 
 influential work of the 1960s and 1970s.   n5 Both Michelman and Sax tried to 
 bring order to takings interpretation while avoiding the Scientific conception 
 of property and its conservative-libertarian conclusion. They did so by 
 construing the Clause as an opportunity for the direct application of systematic 
 political theory. I argue that this strategy succeeds only at the price of 
 stretching the domain of the Clause beyond recognition. Epstein's more recent 
 approach, by contrast, rationalizes the Clause by embracing both the Scientific 
 conception of property and the conservative-libertarian reading that follows 
 from it. Yet Epstein's inter-  [*1925]  pretation is also overexpansive, and I 
 trace its faults back to the Scientific conception of property itself. 
  
       Finally, I argue that the reasons for the original Hohfeldian redefinition 
 of "property" were bad, and that we are not forced to go down the interpretative 
 path that led to both the Michelman-Sax and the Epstein approaches. We should 
 keep the powerful Hohfeldian analytical vocabulary; indeed, I propose an 
 analysis of property centered on a particular structure of Hohfeldian claims, 
 privileges, powers, and immunities. But we should reject the Hohfeldian thesis 
 that "property" refers to property rights themselves. Returning to the more 
 common understanding of property not as rights but as things holds out the 
 prospect of recentering the takings debate around terms that legal academics 
 share with other citizens of the democratic polity. And such commonality is 
 desirable, I take it, whatever one's more particular views about constitutional 
 interpretation, because of the attendant virtues of publicity or transparency in 
 a democratic society's basic laws. 
  
 
 Background to Michelman, Sax, and Epstein: The Impact of the Scientific 
 Conception of Property on the Takings Clause 
  
 The crucial terms for interpreting the Takings Clause are "private property," 
 "taken," "public use," and "just compensation." In this section, I survey some 
 historical landmarks in the interpretation of these terms in order to explain 
 the intellectual legacy inherited by modern academics like Michelman, Sax, and 
 Epstein. This is a history of the successive destabilizations of the previously 
 accepted meanings of the first three crucial terms in the Takings Clause, which 
 (as we will see) led Michelman and Sax to place all of their energies into 
 finding an interpretation of the Clause focused on the fourth term.   n6 
 
 
   Mugler and Hohfeld: The Rise and Fall of the Physical Invasion Test 
  
 The history begins in the late nineteenth century. Any judge deciding a takings 
 case needs guidelines to determine whether the government has in fact taken 
 private property for public use. The dominant nineteenth century rule of 
 decision, known as the physical invasion test, received its classic formulation 
 from the first Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas.   n7 This test is based on 
 the ordinary conception of property as things - property is a thing over which 
 the owner has rights of "free use, enjoyment, and disposal."   n8 The test also 
 sets out a common sense rule for when a taking occurs. The government takes 
 private property when it  [*1926]  takes physical possession of some privately 
 owned thing, either instantly or after gaining title to the thing through the 
 power of eminent domain. By this test, the boundaries of the property are the 
 boundaries that the Clause says the government must not cross - and if the 
 government does not cross these boundaries to gain possession of the thing, then 
 there is no taking. Thus in the Mugler case, a Kansas law prohibiting the 
 manufacture of alcoholic beverages was held not to effect a taking of Mugler's 
 brewery. The State did not appropriate the brewery or make any use of it; the 
 State only restricted the uses to which the brewery could be put. The State 
 merely regulated - it did not "take" - since there was no physical invasion. 
 n9 
  
       The conception of property underlying the physical invasion test came under 
 sharp attack during the second decade of the twentieth century in Wesley 
 Hohfeld's seminal articles on legal analysis.   n10 According to Hohfeld, 
 property cannot be things, like land or breweries; property can only be property 
 rights - the rights over things. The word "property," that is, can only refer to 
 the various claims, privileges, powers, and immunities which people hold that 
 give them control over objects and spaces. Hohfeld was the first to make a clear 
 analytical distinction between property as things and property as rights, and he 
 and his students turned the legal profession decisively towards the second. 
 n11 
  
       Hohfeld and his students fired a barrage of arguments that sunk the old 
 property as things conception within the legal profession. They argued that 
 regarding property as a thing leads to a misplaced focus on physical possession 
 of an object, instead of on the complexes of rights that form the stuff of 
 modern property law. They objected that regarding property as things leaves 
 intellectual property unexplained. They also complained that lawyers had often 
 been misled by the Roman contrast between rights in rem (which can be translated 
 as rights "against things") and rights in personam ("against people") to think 
 that property rights are actually rights "against things" - which, they said, is 
 absurd since of course all rights are against people.   n12 
  
       Most importantly, Hohfeldian analysis was thought to deal the fatal blow to 
 property as things by proving it incapable of handling divided legal control 
 over objects. Bruce Ackerman describes the standard "divided  [*1927]  control" 
 objection to property as things and the legal orthodoxy that formed around it: 
  
 
   In dealing with the concept of property it is possible to detect a consensus 
 view so pervasive that even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to 
 parrot the ritual phrases on command. I think it is fair to say that one of the 
 main points of the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering law 
 students of their primitive lay notions regarding ownership.... Instead of 
 defining the relationship between a person and "his" things ... the law of 
 property considers the way rights to things may be parceled out amongst a host 
 of competing resource users. Each resource user is conceived as holding a bundle 
 of rights vis-à-vis other potential users; indeed in the modern American system, 
 the ways in which user rights may be legally packaged and distributed are 
 wondrously diverse.... Hence, it risks serious confusion to identify any single 
 individual as the owner of any particular thing.... Once one begins to think 
 sloppily, it is all too easy to start thinking that "the" property owner, by 
 virtue of being "the" property owner, must necessarily own a particular bundle 
 of rights over a thing. And this is to commit the error that separates layman 
 from lawyer.   n13 
  
 
       This is the objection that was decisive in swinging the legal conception of 
 property over to the Hohfeldian analysis and away from the "thing-ownership" 
 conception of Mugler. Conceiving of property as things conjures up the idea that 
 there must be a single owner who holds some standard set of rights over a thing. 
 But this idea is ill-suited to the common modern dispersion of the incidents of 
 ownership among several parties. Since the "thing-ownership" model is inadequate 
 to describe the legal realities of the property system, it is equally inadequate 
 for interpreting the Takings Clause: 
  
 
   To any modern lawyer, there is an irreducible crudity about a decision that 
 justifies compensation on the ground that the plaintiff has been deprived of 
 some thing that formerly was "his." If there is anything a lawyer remembers from 
 his legal education, it is that laymen are deeply confused in their property 
 talk; that the law of property concerns itself with bundles of user-rights, not 
 with the awkward idea that things "belong to" particular people.   n14 
  
 
       The law of property concerns itself with bundles of user rights: indeed, 
 "property" just means "property rights." So when the Hohfeldian legal theorist 
 (the "Scientist" in Ackerman's terms) looks at the Takings Clause, he sees it as 
 reflecting the thesis that property is rights not things: 
  
 
   Whenever the state takes any user right out of Jones's bundle and puts it in 
 any other bundle, private property should be understood to have been taken. For 
 it is precisely the Scientist's main  [*1928]  point to deny the propriety of a 
 muddled search amongst the diverse bundles of user rights in quest of those that 
 contain "the" rights of property. Even if Jones's bundle contains but a single 
 user right, it is nonetheless protected against a taking by the clause.   n15 
  
 
       This last passage contains two important theses in addition to property is 
 rights not things. The first we might call each property right is property: 
 because there is no "essence" to property, every stick in a property bundle 
 itself counts as property. The second is the independence of incidents for 
 takings. This follows from each property right is property: if each stick is 
 property, then removing a stick from someone's bundle must be a taking 
 regardless of what other sticks remain in the person's bundle (if any).   n16 
 The plausibility of the independence of incidents can also be shown separately. 
 Suppose P holds property incidents a through j, and the government removes a 
 through h from his bundle. If we don't say that this is a taking, because P is 
 left with incidents i and j, then what would we say if P had transferred i and j 
 the day before the government's action? The logic of divided control seems to 
 compel the idea that what counts for a taking depends only on what the 
 government removes, not on what any person has left. 
  
       In sum, the Hohfeldians dislodged the common sense property as things 
 premise, and substituted for it the property as rights conception that became 
 universal in the legal academy. And once this conception of property as rights 
 was in place, it became almost irresistible to conclude that each property right 
 is "property," and that government action that alters any existing private 
 property right is a "taking" of property. 
  
       Yet as the final passage from Ackerman shows, these three theses present the 
 Scientific interpreter of the Takings Clause with a dilemma. For the range of 
 government acts that impinge on some private property right or other is immense, 
 and requiring compensation each time such an act is performed would make the 
 Takings Clause "one of the most ringing endorsements of the status quo in the 
 history of the human race."   n17 So the Scientific interpreter of the Takings 
 Clause must either find some way to deemphasize the Hohfeldian notion of 
 property in his reading, or accept the Clause as a genuine 
 conservative-libertarian mandate. This is the tension that has been driving 
 takings jurisprudence since the Hohfeldian reconceptualization of property as 
 rights instead of things.  [*1929] 
 
 
  
 Defining a "Taking": Holmes's Diminution of Value Test 
  
 A second classic judicial rule arose shortly after the destabilization of the 
 ordinary meaning of "property" by the Hohfeldians. This is the diminution of 
 value test, sprung from Justice Holmes's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
 Mahon.   n18 Holmes's test relied neither on the old property as things nor on 
 the new property as rights conception. Rather, Holmes tried to shift attention 
 away from the vexing concept of property altogether, toward a novel method of 
 determining whether a taking had occurred. This strategy of shifting the focus 
 of interpretation was to be (as we will see) important for Michelman and Sax. 
 Yet equally important was that Holmes's test itself proved unacceptable to the 
 burgeoning Scientific orthodoxy, and its failure threw doubt on the attempt to 
 put this second key term of the Clause - "taken" - at the center of any 
 interpretation. 
  
       The diminution of value test grants that the government will negate 
 established property rights through any number of its acts, but does not take 
 any such negation to be conclusive as to whether a taking has occurred. Rather, 
 the test distinguishes compensable "takings" from uncompensable "regulations" 
 according to the percentage loss of economic value sustained by the property 
 owner because of the government's action. For example, by this test a statute 
 that reduced the value of someone's parcel of land by 19% would be a regulation, 
 while a 99% devaluation would probably count as a taking. 
  
       The "old" conception of property and the physical invasion test from the 
 days of Mugler are clearly absent in the Holmesian test, since any number of 
 legislative acts can devalue property without the state gaining possession of 
 anything. Yet although Holmes passed over the old property as things conception, 
 he was no Scientist. The Hohfeldian image of property as a bundle of rights is 
 downplayed in Holmes's test in favor of a focus on economic value. Holmes seems 
 to have thought that governmental interference with private property rights was 
 inevitable and that it would be disastrous to require compensation for all such 
 interferences. 
  
       So Holmes took the first horn of the dilemma and shifted the interpretative 
 weight of his reading away from the first crucial word in the phrase and onto 
 the second: away from "property" and onto "taken." The state might invade, or 
 property rights might be interfered with, but a taking occurs only if some 
 person's holdings are diminished in value by a significant percentage through 
 government action. By focusing on economic value, Holmes was able to avoid the 
 extreme implication that every government action that alters property rights is 
 a taking, while maintaining that compensation is required for some government 
 actions that affect private holdings. 
  
       Both Holmes's emphasis on economic value and his strategy of shifting 
 interpretative weight away from "property" influenced later interpret-  [*1930] 
 ers. But the diminution of value test itself cannot satisfy anyone of Scientific 
 scruples. In addition to the obvious problem of setting the percentage that 
 draws the line between a taking and a regulation, the diminution of value test 
 fails because of its reference to owners instead of to incidents - it turns not 
 only on what the government removes, but also on what a person has left. As Sax 
 puts the problem: if the government floods eighty acres of someone's 640 acre 
 plot, is this a 12.5% loss to the 640 acres or a 100% loss to the eighty acres? 
 The first answer necessarily refers to incidents beyond those affected by the 
 governmental action, and so disregards the independence of incidents for 
 takings.   n19 For shouldn't the result be the same in the case where the owner 
 of the 640 acres had sold the eighty acres to a newcomer the day before the 
 flooding? Yet if all governmental actions that reduce the value of some property 
 incident by 100% must be compensated, then we are back to the disastrous 
 conclusion of always requiring compensation.   n20 
 
  
 Berman and Coase: Redefining "Public Use" and Thinking Systematically 
  
 Two final intellectual events shaped the environment in which Michelman, Sax, 
 and Epstein were to form their positive views. The first was the decision in 
 Berman v. Parker concerning the Clause's third crucial term, "public use."   n21 
 In the old Mugler interpretation, the "public use" phrase indicated that the 
 Takings Clause was to be triggered by the government's asserting in itself (or 
 in the public) a right to use private property in the ordinary sense of managing 
 a facility or occupying a space. But by the time of Berman - when "property" and 
 "taken" had both changed meanings - the context for this understanding of the 
 Clause had disappeared. The question of the Clause was no longer whether the 
 state was asserting a right to use some thing by managing or occupying it. As we 
 have seen, the question of the Clause had become whether the state's actions 
 affected any rights in someone's bundle, or diminished the economic value that 
 these rights protected. And there is no place in these new interpretations for 
 the old and more literal meaning of the phrase "public use." 
  
       The Berman Court decided that the "public use" language should instead be 
 construed to ask whether a taking accomplished some public purpose. It held that 
 so long as a government action that affected private property served some 
 broadly defined public goal - where a public goal is the contrast to a private 
 goal - its action fell within the limits of "public use." Thus in the case 
 itself, the condemnation and transfer of a privately held department store to a 
 private business interest counted as a taking for "public use" because the 
 condemnation and transfer were part of a  [*1931]  neighborhood redevelopment 
 scheme that would add to the orderliness and beauty of the district. The taking 
 was for "public use" because the taking served a legitimate purpose of the state 
 (order, beautification), even though the state did not assert in itself a new 
 right to use (manage or occupy) the building. In this way the meaning of "public 
 use" was reconciled to the new interpretations of "property" and "taken."   n22 
  
       Finally, Coase's two seminal early papers had a great impact on those 
 thinking about the Takings Clause scientifically.   n23 They were taken to deal 
 another blow to the physical invasion test (and thus to property as things) by 
 showing that it was pointless on efficiency grounds to choose between two 
 competing private uses of property as to which use "caused" a harm to the other. 
 Crop growing hinders cattle grazing as much as cattle grazing hinders crop 
 growing, and a quiet neighborhood conflicts with a noisy brickyard as much as 
 the reverse. Insofar as physical invasion looked less relevant to resolving 
 issues of competing private uses, it began to look less relevant to resolving 
 conflicts between public and private uses as well.   n24 
  
       More generally, Coase's innovative style of analysis held out the prospect 
 of systematizing property law by forcing it to work toward the goals of 
 political economic theory (in Coase's case, the goal was productive efficiency). 
 This desire to systematize through the application of political theory was 
 inherited by Michelman, Sax, and Epstein, who brought it to bear, in different 
 ways on the Takings Clause. 
  
 
 Michelman and Sax: Using Political Theory to Interpret the Clause 
  
 Michelman and Sax saw their task as replacing or rationalizing the "crazy 
 quilt" of previous judicial tests with sophisticated political philosophy.   n25 
 Yet by the time they sat down to write their classic articles, each of the first 
 three concepts of the Takings Clause had come to seem either useless or 
 dangerous as an interpretative focus. "Private property" itself was of course 
 the biggest problem. The old conception of property as things and its physical 
 invasion test had been completely undermined by Hohfeld and Coase. Yet the 
 rights-oriented Scientific conception of "property" (which Michelman and Sax, 
 who were trained in the Scientific orthodoxy, certainly accepted) threatened to 
 turn the Takings Clause into a conservative-libertarian mandate. And this 
 mandate was not one that liberal scholars like Michelman and Sax were willing to 
 accept.   n26  [*1932] 
  
       Moreover, the second key term of the Clause - "taken" - had been rendered 
 problematic as a basis for interpretation by the Scientific objections to 
 Holmes's diminution of value test. And in the wake of Berman there was no 
 content in "public use" beyond its being a vague stand-in for state action 
 towards some legitimate end. 
  
       Michelman and Sax broke through this interpretational impasse by touching 
 only lightly on the troublesome first three concepts of the Clause, and resting 
 their interpretations on the "justice" inherent in the fourth concept: "just 
 compensation." They turned the problem posed by the Takings Clause into the 
 problem of just reallocation of resources, familiar from classical political 
 economy and naturally suited to comprehensive political theory. Here is how the 
 Clause appeared to Sax: 
  
 
   Once reoriented to [a] more fluid concept of property as economic value 
 defined by a process of competition, the question of when to compensate a 
 diminution in the value of property resulting from government activity becomes a 
 much less difficult one to formulate. The question now is: to what kind of 
 competition ought existing values be exposed.   n27 
  
 Here is how the Clause appeared to Michelman: 
  
 
   In a given period, a person enjoys a certain liberty to do as he wills with 
 certain things which he "owns," and a certain flow of income (utility, welfare, 
 good) .... It is clear that this person's current flow of welfare is 
 significantly affected by his being allowed to extract certain kinds of benefits 
 from [these resources]. If any of these resources should be diverted by society 
 into different uses, his personal welfare situation will be altered .... One 
 effect of the decision to reallocate resources will have been to redistribute 
 welfare among the members of society .... [So the question is w]hen a social 
 decision to redirect economic resources entails painfully obvious opportunity 
 costs, how shall these costs ultimately be distributed among all the members of 
 society?   n28 
  
 We have seen why Michelman in the first sentence would want to flag the word 
 "owns" as suspect: it is part of the pre-Hohfeldian view of property that modern 
 Scientific analysis rejects. Yet the most notable aspect of these passages is 
 how both Sax and Michelman see through "property" and construe the Takings 
 Clause as being about something else - economic value or welfare. No longer is 
 the Takings Clause concerned specifically with governmental interference with 
 property in either the pre-Hohfeldian or even the Scientific sense. Rather, it 
 is about governmental  [*1933]  competition with privately controlled economic 
 value, or it is about a social decision to redirect economic resources in a way 
 that diminishes some private party's utility or well-being. The concept of 
 property is expendable within these analyses of the Clause, since property is 
 taken to be merely a proxy for other measures of personal advantage. 
  
       The second two of the first three concepts in the Clause ("taking" and 
 "public use") are expendable as well. For Michelman and Sax the judgment that a 
 governmental action is a "taking" has no independent criterion (as it did for 
 Harlan and Holmes) but is wholly dependent on whether the correct theory of 
 justice requires that the act be compensated. Thus Michelman: "'Taking' is, of 
 course, constitutional law's expression for any sort of publicly inflicted 
 private injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensation." 
 n29 Any connotations of invasion or even a percentage diminution of value have 
 disappeared here, leaving "taking" to fill only a functional role in the theory 
 of just redistribution. So it is also natural that "public use" in these 
 interpretations refers not to a governmental use of private property, but points 
 only to governmental action in general. 
  
       What led Michelman and Sax to treat three of the crucial terms of the 
 Takings Clause as dispensable? In particular, how did the central concept in the 
 Takings Clause come to be not "property," but "economic value" or "welfare"? If 
 Michelman and Sax believed in the modern Scientific conception of property as 
 rights (as they clearly did   n30 ), why did they avoid using the Scientific 
 conception of property in favor of these quite different notions? 
  
       First, of course, neither scholar wanted to end up in the 
 conservative-libertarian reading of the Clause to which the Scientific 
 conception of property points. And here it seems that the legacy of Mahon in the 
 case law was significant. Although both scholars rejected the diminution of 
 value test, both Holmes's interpretative strategy in shifting weight off of 
 "property" and his construal of the Takings Clause as adjudicating between 
 contending economic interests must have influenced Michelman's and Sax's 
 understandings of how the Clause was best interpreted. 
  
       Moreover, emphasizing "economic value" or "welfare" instead of "property" 
 allowed the legal scholars to embed the principles of political philosophy more 
 deeply into their constructions. For these terms are part of the foundational 
 vocabulary of modern political economy, and speaking in these terms makes it 
 possible to construe the Takings Clause as a context for the direct application 
 of philosophical theory. 
  
       Michelman's work is particularly interesting here, and will lead us to the 
 main criticisms of this strategy of interpretation. Michelman pro-  [*1934] 
 poses two independent interpretations of what the Takings Clause pertains to and 
 requires, one based on utilitarian theory and the other on Rawls's theory of 
 justice. On both of these interpretations the Clause comes into play whenever a 
 government action redirects resources from which some private party derives 
 welfare. Michelman's utilitarian construal of the Clause requires weighing the 
 welfare gains of a proposed redistribution against the welfare costs borne by 
 the demoralized "losers" from the redistribution and the cost to the government 
 of compensating these losers. In Michelman's Rawlsian reading, compensation for 
 a redistribution is not required when a rational "loser" from a redistribution 
 could be expected to see that such decisions will benefit people like him over 
 the long run.   n31 
  
       Now at the outset I claimed that influential academic legal approaches to 
 the Takings Clause are far removed from any ordinary understanding of what is at 
 issue in the Clause and the kinds of reasoning appropriately used in settling 
 cases, and I think that this claim is borne out here. Michelman's 
 interpretations of the Clause, though resourceful in their application of 
 philosophical theories, bear only a tenuous relation to what a nonspecialist or 
 layman might think about when and how the Clause should be applied. 
  
       In fact the relationship is so tenuous that we might wonder whether 
 Michelman is still offering an interpretation of the Takings Clause, or whether 
 he is using the Clause as an opportunity to apply political philosophy to a 
 substantially different topic: the topic of government actions that have 
 redistributive effects on resources and thus welfare.   n32 The question of 
 interpretation arises because of the distance of the language on the 
 constitutional page from the concepts of the philosophical theories. There are, 
 of course, important relationships between property and welfare and economic 
 value. Yet a natural, open question to ask in response to Michelman's or Sax's 
 interpretation of the Takings Clause is "which of the government's actions that 
 in some way affect a citizen's welfare (or that affect the value of a citizen's 
 resources) is also a taking of private property for public use?" 
  
       Indeed, asking this question seems essential when one realizes how expansive 
 the Takings Clause becomes once the concept of property is supplanted by welfare 
 or economic value. When Michelman asks "if deliberate government activity 
 foreseeably entails some injurious impact on an established private interest, 
 how can we ... avoid concluding at once that compensation is in order?"   n33 it 
 is hard to see how the question  [*1935]  can be limited to government acts like 
 condemning land for a new post office. For if this is the question asked by the 
 Takings Clause, how can we keep the Clause from bearing on government acts like 
 the lifting of a trade embargo, or the declaration of a war, or the decision to 
 increase production at the money-presses? If all actions that affect private 
 welfare or private economic interests are potentially at issue, then the scope 
 of the Clause will have expanded to cover almost any government action 
 whatsoever. At this point I think we should wonder again whether we do still 
 have what could be called an interpretation of a text that prohibits taking 
 private property for public use - and in any case, whether we have been forced 
 to push our understanding of the Takings Clause as far from the text as it has 
 gone. 
  
       Michelman and Sax may have been led astray by assuming that order could only 
 be brought to the Takings Clause by casting out the language of property and 
 recasting the Clause directly into the language of political philosophy - into 
 the language of welfare, economic value, or whatever. Yet there is another way 
 that political theory could be used to give a rational structure to takings 
 doctrine that would not require abandoning the concept of property altogether. 
 This strategy would be first to determine the general relation of private 
 property to the values central to the preferred theory - for example, to 
 determine the various ways in which property rules can promote utility. The 
 Takings Clause could then be interpreted to be one rule that, together with 
 other property rules in an overall scheme, fostered the realization of the 
 theory's goals (e.g., maximizing utility). This strategy would reinsert the idea 
 of property into the interpretation of the Takings Clause, and could thus hope 
 to avoid the overexpansiveness that comes with the Michelman-Sax approach. 
  
 
 
 
 
  Epstein's Theory of the Takings Clause: Accepting the 
 Conservative-Libertarian Reading 
  
 This is just the sort of strategy that Richard Epstein has been following since 
 1985.   n34 In terms of the historical survey above, Epstein's theory would most 
 naturally be placed at a time between the Hohfeldian redefinition of "property" 
 and Holmes's attempt to change the subject. Epstein accepts all of the theses 
 associated with the Scientific conception of prop-  [*1936]  erty: that property 
 is rights not things, that each property right is property, and the independence 
 of incidents for takings. And he rejects any attempt to substitute welfare or 
 economic value for property as the topic of the Takings Clause. 
  
       This means that Epstein accepts - indeed he celebrates - the 
 conservative-libertarian conclusions that everyone since Hohfeld has been trying 
 to avoid: that government takes property whenever it disturbs any privately held 
 property right and must compensate for all such disruptions.   n35 Epstein 
 maintains that requiring compensation for all such disturbances of property 
 rights will not be disastrous (as Holmes seems to have thought) but will, on the 
 contrary, maximize utility. He also believes that his reading stays close to a 
 layman's natural-rights understanding of the terms and purposes of the Clause - 
 indeed, that his is the best, and perhaps the only, coherent literal reading of 
 the Takings Clause.   n36 It is worth setting out Epstein's interpretation in 
 some detail. 
  
       Epstein's theory begins with a utilitarian grounding of the rights found in 
 the traditional libertarian state of nature.   n37 Individual rights of life, 
 liberty, and property are mandated by utility maximization. In particular, the 
 rule that first possession of an object confers property rights over that object 
 is the only efficient rule for solving the natural problems of conflict over 
 scarce resources. Moreover, each first possessor must be assigned an "absolute" 
 bundle of property rights over what she appropriates, because any qualified 
 bundle would lead to utility-draining uncertainties among the natives concerning 
 who should be thought to have which rights. The utilitarian considerations that 
 require these absolute rights also require the familiar libertarian agency 
 theory of the state, which says that a state can be endowed with no rights 
 beyond those originally held by individual citizens on whose behalf it acts. 
 n38 
  
       Once property entitlements have been determined, Epstein says, two threats 
 to utility arise in sequence. The first is that collective action problems 
 cannot be overcome through coordinated voluntary action. The only way to cut 
 through collective action knots is to empower a state to manipulate individuals' 
 property rights against their wills when there are, for example, "tragedies of 
 the commons" (such as the overexploitation of a water source) looming. Yet 
 attributing this power to the state brings on a second danger, which is 
 "rent-seeking." Once a state is empowered to manipulate individuals' property 
 rights, special interest groups will devote resources to get the state to 
 manipulate property rights  [*1937]  in their favor (for example, the paper 
 industry may lobby for a law to prevent milk from being sold in plastic 
 containers   n39 ). And other groups will expend resources resisting these 
 changes. Such expenditures of otherwise productive resources (rent-seeking) lead 
 to pure deadweight social utility loss. 
  
       Epstein's response to the threat of rent-seeking is to restrict the state to 
 making those changes in property rules that will result in a net social gain, 
 and to insist that any such gain be distributed pro rata according to 
 pre-existing property entitlements.   n40 The state may revise property rules, 
 that is, only if it makes the social pie bigger and divides the surplus so as to 
 maintain the relative sizes of people's pieces of the pie. This constrained 
 empowerment of the state allows the polity to overcome collective action 
 problems while reducing the dangers of rent-seeking, since one citizen can only 
 gain through state action if others also gain proportionately to their current 
 holdings. 
  
       It is this combination of state power and restriction that Epstein believes 
 is discoverable within the plain meaning of the Takings Clause. A state action 
 triggers "takings" scrutiny if it alters any incident of any private party's 
 property bundle. Such an act must be for "public use" if it is to be legitimate 
 at all: it must either protect existing property entitlements or create a social 
 surplus by overcoming a collective action problem. And if such a surplus is 
 created by state action, there must be "just compensation" to ensure that the 
 surplus is distributed pro rata. In short, any interference with an incident of 
 private property is a taking and will only be legitimate if the holders of all 
 incidents are compensated with a proportionate share of the gains generated by 
 the interference. Epstein has squared the circle: the "ordinary meaning" of the 
 Clause is also the one that, if respected, would produce the greatest social 
 good. 
  
       Epstein wields his interpretation of the Clause with great vigor. There is 
 no distinction between "taking" and "regulation" in this view. Any law that 
 hinders or makes conditional a transfer of property alters a property right and 
 therefore triggers the Clause, as does any law that limits any right of 
 exclusion or use.   n41 Some of these "takings" are legitimate, since 
 compensation can be provided to rights-holders either explicitly or in-kind. Yet 
 other familiar laws and programs are irremediably unconstitutional. These 
 include progressive taxation, most zoning laws, minimum wage and price-setting 
 laws, mandatory collective bargaining rules, and most welfare programs and 
 compulsory contribution schemes like Social Security. None of these laws and 
 programs increase the size of society's total utility pie, and even if they 
 could, there is no chance that they would distribute this surplus to people 
 proportionate to the size of their slices ex ante. The reforms are either 
 inefficient in themselves or are redistribu-  [*1938]  tive in a way that 
 results from and encourages the inefficiencies of rent-seeking.   n42 
  
       Many commentators have criticized Epstein either for not proving the 
 congruence of utilitarianism and natural rights or for wanting heartlessly to 
 dismantle the essential programs of the New Deal.   n43 Whether or not these 
 criticisms are correct, Epstein must at some point be met where he is strongest, 
 which is on his understanding of "property" and his interpretation of the other 
 terms in the Clause. 
 
  
 Criticism of Epstein's Theory of Takings 
  
 Epstein's theory is the culmination of the Hohfeldian redefinition of property 
 as rights, not things. Epstein merely uses the conclusions required by the 
 Scientific conception of property - such as the independence of incidents for 
 takings - as part of a larger, complex utilitarian theory of politics. Rather 
 than ignoring the Scientific conception of property when applying political 
 theory to the Clause, as did Michelman and Sax, Epstein highlights the 
 Scientific conception of property in order to show how it makes the Clause work 
 toward the goals of his favored theory and the conservative-libertarian 
 conclusion. 
  
       My main criticism of Epstein is that his reading of the Takings Clause, 
 though narrower in scope than Michelman's and Sax's, is still implausibly broad. 
 The Scientific conception of property forces Epstein to count as "takings" all 
 sorts of government actions that no one would otherwise think of counting as 
 such. It would be possible to make this objection simply by listing examples of 
 the counterintuitive implications of Epstein's theory. But I will instead build 
 up to the criticism by proposing a more detailed picture of property rights and 
 examining its fit within Epstein's view. This material will lay the basis in the 
 next section for the conclusion that it is possible for us to retain the 
 sophisticated Hohfeldian analytical vocabulary in our understanding of property, 
 without being pushed to the Hohfeldian thesis that property is rights not things 
 and its corollaries. 
  
       The usual image of property in legal literature since the Scientific 
 revolution is of a "bundle of rights" - specifically a bundle of Hohfeldian 
 [*1939]  claims, privileges, powers, and immunities.   n44 As I propose 
 elsewhere   n45 this "bundle" of property rights may be more precisely 
 represented as an orderly structure of Hohfeldian incidents in the following 
 arrangement: 
  
   [SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL] 
  
       The importance of this particular structure of Hohfeldian rights is that 
 with it one can represent the "mechanics" of all of the typical 
 property-regarding actions. When you use the computer that you own, you exercise 
 a privilege; when you exclude trespassers from your house, you exercise a claim. 
 We each have an immunity against others annulling our claims over our property 
 or others foisting new claims upon us. And appropriation, transfer, and 
 abandonment of property all involve the exercise of a power to create or cancel 
 (in ourselves or in others) claim-rights over objects. The further details of 
 how to represent various typical property-regarding actions by reference to the 
 Hohfeldian rights in the structure are not so important here, but the interested 
 reader may wish to satisfy herself that this structure of rights is up to the 
 task of representing all such actions. 
  
       For our purposes here, the important fact about the diagrammatic 
 representation of Hohfeldian property rights is that it has two levels. The 
 first-order rights represent the property rights to the exclusive use of an 
 object. But we also need to include second-order rights in the diagram to 
 explain the voluntary transfer of these rights of exclusive use from one person 
 to another. When, for example, you give me a gift, you do not merely transfer 
 physical possession from yourself to me; you must also  [*1940]  exercise a 
 second-order right (a power) to move your rights of exclusive use of the gift 
 from yourself to me. Any set of rights capable of representing property transfer 
 must therefore have such a layered structure. 
  
       Now Epstein should have no problem in principle with this multi-leveled 
 diagrammatic representation of property rights, as it is only a more 
 sophisticated version of the Scientific analysis that he shares with most 
 academic property scholars. Indeed, he should welcome the attempt to replace the 
 vague metaphor of a "bundle" of rights with an explicit depiction of the 
 interrelated rights involved in property. He could take this idea of a property 
 structure on board and translate his property is rights position into the claim 
 that each of the rights shown in Figure 1 is, in itself, correctly called 
 "property." Epstein would no doubt emphasize that the full property structure 
 represented here can be disaggregated in many ways through voluntary 
 transactions, so that each of two or more people may hold only fragmentary and 
 overlapping structures of Hohfeldian rights over a particular object. He might 
 also give examples of the various ways that the common law and statutes qualify 
 and attenuate the incidents with which any individual may be vested. These 
 points are certainly correct. 
  
       Yet once we examine the structure of rights with Epstein's agency theory of 
 the state in mind, we see that there must be some conflict within his view. 
 Recall that the agency theory says that a state can be endowed with no rights 
 beyond those originally held by the individual citizens on whose behalf it acts. 
 Yet recall also that Epstein's state has the power to alter any component of 
 individuals' property-rights structures against their wills when doing so will 
 help to overcome collective action problems (like tragedies of the commons). 
 These two views do not fit together. 
  
       One can see how Epstein's state might become endowed with powers to alter 
 individuals' property rights of exclusive use. Individuals, after all, have 
 natural (second-order) property rights to alter their own (first-order) rights 
 of exclusive use, so there is no conflict with the agency theory of the state 
 when the state becomes endowed with second-order powers. But the government that 
 Epstein describes also has the power to alter individuals' legal powers of 
 transfer - their second-order rights - when collective action problems loom. And 
 where would the government get such a power? Individuals are not naturally 
 vested with higher-than-second-order powers to alter their second-order rights, 
 so it seems by the agency theory that a state could not possibly be vested with 
 such powers either.   n46 Yet the state that Epstein describes clearly has 
 higher-  [*1941]  than-second-order powers to alter individuals' rights of 
 transfer, and so clearly has powers beyond those held by individuals in the 
 state of nature: 
  
   [SEE FIGURE IN ORIGINAL] 
  
       I take this to be a correct schematic representation of the relationship 
 between the modern state and individuals' property rights. I note in passing 
 that the "higher-order" powers marked in this extended diagram could be further 
 specified (e.g., courts have third-level powers over individuals' property 
 rights, legislatures have fourth-level powers over these powers of the courts, 
 perhaps citizens have yet higher-order powers over these legislative bodies, and 
 so on). 
  
       Still, Epstein might not be worried. He might just jettison his agency 
 theory of the state as a remnant of his natural-rights libertarianism that 
 should not have survived his transition to being a utilitarian 
 foundationalist. Indeed, Epstein could say that the extended diagram (Figure 2) 
 offers a good way to represent his thesis. For he could say it shows quite well 
 what it means for private property to be taken. Whenever the state exercises its 
 higher-order powers over individuals' property rights - whenever it alters an 
 individually held right to use, exclude, or transfer - it takes private 
 property. This doesn't settle the legitimacy of the state's exercise of its 
 powers in any particular case, since takings can be legitimate if justly 
 compensated. But Epstein could say that the extended diagram represents what he 
 regards as the correct position on the contested conceptual issue of when a 
 taking occurs. 
  
       I think that the diagram does help to capture Epstein's position, but that 
 it also shows why we should not follow Epstein on what constitutes a taking 
 unless we are forced to do so. For now we can see clearly just how many 
 governmental actions must fall under Epstein's category of takings,  [*1942] 
 and how far Epstein actually is from any ordinary understanding of the terms and 
 the workings of the Clause. 
  
       For if we say, as Epstein does, that every governmental alteration of any 
 private property right is a taking of private property, then we must label as 
 "takings" at least all of the following alterations of individuals' property 
 rights: laws forbidding the manufacture of nerve gas or forbidding the sale of 
 pornography to minors; laws mandating construction standards for apartment 
 buildings, toxicity testing for medications, and nutritional labels on food 
 packaging; antitrust laws; fair housing laws; and laws requiring hunting 
 permits. Each of these state actions removes or attenuates a previously existing 
 private right - a power to transfer, a claim to exclude others, or a privilege 
 of use. Even when the government mandates that cars have seat belts, and even 
 when the government lowers the speed limit, it has "taken private property" by 
 Epstein's test - because through these mandates the government removes rights 
 that citizens previously held to use their vehicles in particular ways.   n47 
  
       Now it is of course appropriate to require the government to justify its 
 policies, and perhaps some of the above policies are unjustifiable. But there is 
 no ordinary sense in which legislation requiring that cars have seat belts 
 "takes private property for public use." Nor does it make any common sense to 
 classify the other policies above, such as nutritional labeling or fair housing 
 laws, as "takings." Epstein's reading of the Takings Clause, though more 
 constrained than Michelman's and Sax's, is still implausibly expansive. 
  
       Two questions arise once we see how far Epstein's construction of the 
 Takings Clause departs from a common sense understanding of its range of 
 application. The first is the question of how Epstein could think that his 
 reading is close to a literal reading of the text. The explanation for this may 
 just be biographical: legal scholars, as all scholars, sometimes lose track of 
 the distance between their own technical concepts and laymen's concepts.   n48 
  
       The more interesting question is how Epstein, like Michelman and Sax, ended 
 up with such an overbroad and counterintuitive reading of the scope of the 
 Takings Clause. And by now the answer should be clear.  [*1943]  The source of 
 the expansiveness in Epstein's interpretation is again just the Hohfeldian claim 
 that property is rights not things - although Epstein, unlike Michelman and Sax, 
 gets into difficulties not because he tries to avoid this claim, but because he 
 embraces it. Once this central Hohfeldian claim is accepted, the thesis of the 
 independence of incidents for takings seems inevitable. That is, it seems 
 inevitable that "taking private property" will be construed as "limiting any 
 private property entitlement," which forces the Clause open to a huge range of 
 cases. The extraordinary implications of this interpretation should prompt us to 
 reexamine the arguments that led to the central Scientific doctrine in the first 
 place. 
  
 
  Hohfeld Revisited 
  
 We should review the Hohfeldian criticisms of the "thing-ownership" conception 
 of property that led down the road to Michelman, Sax, and Epstein. According to 
 the Hohfeldians, property is not a relationship between a person and an object, 
 as believed by the masses, but a legal relationship between people with respect 
 to objects: property is rights not things. The sophisticated lawyer must think 
 in this way because she knows that there is not just one kind of legal 
 relationship that a person can have to an object. The incidents of ownership can 
 be divided up in any number of ways, and there is no minimal set of rights that 
 constitutes the "ownership relation." Property cannot be things because 
 sometimes people hold property rights without there being anyone who clearly 
 "owns" the object of those rights. Moreover, no set of incidents is essential 
 for calling a set of property rights "property," so each property right is 
 property in itself. And the thesis that each property right is property yields 
 the conservative-libertarian (Epstein's) conclusions because it supports the 
 thesis of the independence of incidents for takings. 
  
       All of this is so familiar to the academic legal mind that it hardly seems 
 to bear repeating. Divided control over objects shows that "ownership" is a 
 vague folk-concept to be avoided; casting each property right as "property" lets 
 us explain divided control in all of its many forms. Since the Constitution 
 speaks in the primitive language of ownership of things, it must be 
 reinterpreted using the sophisticated Scientific conception of property as 
 rights appropriate to the modern world. Epstein merely draws the logical 
 conclusion that Michelman and Sax wanted to avoid: to disturb any property right 
 is to take private property. 
  
       Yet this progression cannot be carried through, because the Constitution 
 does not speak in the primitive language of ownership at all. The Takings Clause 
 does not say "nor shall what a person owns be taken for public use without just 
 compensation." Nor does it say that "no one shall be deprived of ownership," nor 
 that "nothing that belongs to a private party shall be taken." "Owns," 
 "ownership," and "belongs" - these terms might lead to trouble with respect to 
 divided control, but none of these terms is in the Clause. If divided control is 
 what pushed constitutional  [*1944]  interpretation away from the reading of the 
 Clause in Mugler, then it was not a push given by the words on the page. 
  
       This should give us pause to reflect on the objection to the old conception 
 of property as things. Perhaps what should be abandoned is not the idea that 
 property is things, but just the idea that property always involves a single 
 holder of property rights or "undivided control." Perhaps we can say that there 
 are things that are property but that may not be owned by or do not belong to a 
 single person. This seems natural enough. A piece of land held in trust, for 
 example, is still private property despite the fact that the trustee and the 
 beneficiary divide the rights over the land between them. 
  
       All we need to add is how we distinguish those things that are property from 
 those things that are not. But this seems possible too - private property is all 
 those things over which private property rights are held. And private property 
 rights are just those rights in that two-leveled structure of Hohfeldian rights 
 that we saw in Figure 1. Anything that is the object of such a structure of 
 Hohfeldian rights is properly called "property," however these rights are 
 divided up and however they are held among different people. 
  
       With this understanding of "property" we can handle all of the influential 
 Hohfeldian objections to property as things. We can grant for the sake of 
 argument that the things that are property include intangible as well as 
 corporeal objects, and we of course acknowledge that all of the Hohfeldian 
 rights in the figures are "against people" not "against things." Most 
 importantly, we need not claim that all of the rights over a thing that make 
 that thing private property must be held by one person or even by a few. 
 Property is any object of that structure of Hohfeldian rights with which we can 
 represent the typical property-regarding actions, regardless of who holds which 
 of these rights. The objections to property as things disappear when the concept 
 of property is dissociated from what is truly a holdover from the nineteenth 
 century (or perhaps the mythology of the nineteenth century), the concept of 
 universal, undivided control over objects. 
  
       With the "new" conception of property, we can keep the thought that property 
 rights are relations between people with respect to things and the sophisticated 
 Hohfeldian language to describe these relations. We can keep the modern insight 
 that these rights-relationships can become very complicated. But we move away 
 from the uncomfortable conflation of an object of rights with the rights 
 themselves. Far from all property rights being property, none are - they are 
 just property rights. Property is what property rights are rights over. We are 
 not forced to a counterintuitive conception of property because of divided 
 control, as is commonly assumed by property scholars in all camps.  [*1945] 
  
 
  
 Conclusion 
  
 I claimed at the outset that currently influential academic approaches to the 
 Takings Clause are surprisingly distant from each other and from a nonspecialist 
 sense of what the Clause means. I hope to have explained why this has come to be 
 so. Current academic interpretation is pulled either towards the Michelman-Sax 
 model of wholesale reconstruction of the Clause according to some philosophical 
 theory, or the Epstein model with its conservative-libertarian formalism. But 
 neither model can generate a plausible reading of the Clause's scope and 
 workings. Like a rogue star, the Scientific conception of property as rights has 
 drawn academic interpretations of the Takings Clause farther and farther out of 
 their orbits, until they can no longer be seen from Earth. 
  
       This leaves us with the question of what takings jurisprudence would look 
 like had the Hohfeldians not mischaracterized "property" so many decades ago. 
 And, more importantly, how should we read the Clause now that we see that the 
 common conception of property as things is better than the Scientific conception 
 that eclipsed it? For surely we cannot simply go back to the old physical 
 invasion test of Mugler. Physical invasion is now irretrievably quaint, as well 
 as too simplistic for the complexities of modern property law and our 
 contemporary regulatory state. 
  
       What we need in particular is an interpretation of the Clause that is based 
 on the ordinary notion of property as things and that is sensitive to the 
 multiform possibilities of modern divided ownership and the many powers of a 
 modern government. We also need something to say about government acts that 
 impinge upon various intangible economic assets like trade secrets, stock 
 options, goodwill, and so on.   n49 I cannot even begin to lay out such an 
 interpretation here (one cannot say a little without saying a lot); and it seems 
 better in any case to invite interested readers to imagine for themselves the 
 shape that a recentered interpretation of the Takings Clause might have. Yet I 
 would like to give one reason for thinking that it is a promising line to 
 pursue. Once we give the correct sense to "private property" and so need no 
 longer worry about the conservative-libertarian conclusion, the other terms in 
 the Takings Clause revive as guides to its interpretation. 
  
       For instance, the part of the Clause that says "nor shall private property 
 be taken for public use" emerges from its obscurity since Berman to suggest that 
 takings scrutiny should be brought to bear on cases in which some privately held 
 object comes to be used by the public or its agents, and perhaps also on those 
 cases where some private agent is required by the public to use some property in 
 a particular way. Once we free ourselves from property as rights and its 
 implausible theorems, we see that the combined language of the Clause actually 
 constrains interpretation much more closely than one would think by reading the 
 current literature,  [*1946]  which assumes that some of the Clause's central 
 concepts have no content of their own. 
  
       Which is not at all to say that we must be literalists in constitutional 
 interpretation. I expect that any plausible perspective on constitutional 
 interpretation would accept the general point of this Essay - that we should 
 give up what is pretty clearly an interpretational mistake that we have 
 inherited. Whatever one's overall view of reading the Constitution as a whole, I 
 take it that there is little reason to continue with a redefinition of a key 
 term that was motivated by a bad argument. And there should be, from all 
 perspectives, a good reason to begin interpretation by construing key terms as 
 people commonly do. For then citizens who are legal specialists, and citizens 
 who are not, are more likely to have similar views about the meanings of the 
 fundamental laws under which they all, after all, must live. 
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